We have adopted a specialist team approach to our practices for many years. We feel that this is the way our clients want us to work, and that specialisation leads to the provision of a better service.
We have adopted a specialist team approach to our practices for many years. We feel that this is the way our clients want us to work, and that specialisation leads to the provision of a better service.
Insights
15/09/2026
It is rare I have cause to think about whether a claimant has standing to bring a probate claim. In the overwhelming majority of cases, standing will be obvious. As probate practitioners, we are used to the usual cadre of claimants: a disgruntled child, a disinherited spouse, a disaffected former beneficiary. Every now and again, we see a trustee in bankruptcy enter the arena. We also occasionally see claims from those who clearly do not have standing – those so obviously unconnected to the deceased or the estate that it gives us no cause to investigate further.
One day, an ambiguous case will come across your desk. When that day comes, this article will provide the toolkit needed, not just to help you ascertain whether a person has standing, but to enable you to spot that ambiguous case in the first place.
CPR r. 57.7(1) states “The [probate] claim form must contain a statement of the nature of the interest of the claimant and of each defendant in the estate”. Whilst r. 57.7(1) could undoubtedly be clearer, one can draw out the requirement that a claimant must have an interest in the estate. This embodies a requirement that can be traced back to the 1700s and the practice of the Prerogative Courts of Canterbury and York.
The CPR is silent on what interest is required. In the pre-CPR cases, the general requirement is stated as being a “sufficient interest”. This descriptor has been deployed in the handful of post-CPR cases which have touched on the issue, with only three reported cases turning on the issue. But that takes us no further. We need to know what is actually required.
To my research, this question has not been definitively answered. There have been a number of cases, pre- and post-CPR which have decided a given person does or does not have a sufficient interest. However, an exact answer and composite statement of the law is missing. I would not necessarily say it now falls to me to provide that answer; nevertheless, I have set out to give one.
The general principles were settled by the Court of Appeal in Randall v Randall [2017] Ch. 77. Lord Dyson MR, following a review of the leading pre- and post-CPR authorities, held (i) that “interest” is construed broadly, and (ii) the question is one of procedural, not substantive, law. At [19], Lord Dyson MR adopted the earlier reasoning of HHJ Mackie QC at [9] in O’Brien v Seagrave [2007] 1 WLR 2002 as to why a claimant under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (“1975 Act”) has a sufficient interest. Those reasons, summarised, are:
1. The claimant has a clear and accepted financial interest in the outcome of the probate claim dispute.
2. Though the judgment will not produce an immediate financial result, that is equally true of other areas of litigation where a claim is permitted to go ahead (i.e. claims for declarations).
3. The construction of “interest” to include an interest under the 1975 Act would not open the flood gates. The facts of this Seagrave are unusual but if there were others like it, this would emphasise the importance of removing a potentially unjust obstacle.
4. There is a further practical reason: if this action could not proceed but the claimant’s claim under the 1975 Act went ahead, the judge, when considering all the circumstances, might well feel considerable unease about proceeding on a possibly false assumption about the validity of the will. That might lead to a grant being revoked and to further delay, uncertainty and expense for (what was) a small estate.
McCombe LJ added that the question is determined pragmatically on a case-by-case basis without a rigid test.
In Randall, the probate claimant was a creditor of a beneficiary. On proper analysis, it is clear such a person has an interest in the estate. They are directly financially affected by the beneficiary’s inheritance, or lack of inheritance, under a potentially invalid will. In contrast, a creditor of the estate does not have that link – they will get their money regardless of the will/intestacy position (save perhaps questions of satisfaction).
Seagrave presents a similar position. As HHJ Mackie QC identified, the 1975 Act confers a claim which is dependent upon the terms of the will and identity of the beneficiaries. In turn, a 1975 Act claimant has a financial interest, though it may be future, which is affected by the will admitted to probate.
Seagrave and Randall sit at odds with the first case to consider r. 57.7(1): Green v Briscoe [2005] EWHC 809 (Ch). Master Bragge adopted a narrower test for “interest” and held a 1975 Act claimant does not have a sufficient interest. The decision in Green is no longer good law (if ever it was): it was superseded by the contrary decision in Seagrave which in turn was approved and adopted by the Court of Appeal in Randall.
Pausing there, the post-CPR domestic case law provides a fairly clear steer on how one may get to an answer, though they fall short of giving an answer. I am acutely aware of McCombe LJ’s obiter statement that there is not a rigid test to be applied, but I think the test can be refined further.
Assistance is found in the Northern Irish case of Moore v Cushley [2025] NICh 12. Moore regarded a materially identical requirement under the Order 76 rule (2) of the Rules of the Court of Judicature (NI) 1980. After review of the above English authorities and the Commonwealth position, Huddleston J held (i) “interest” suggests a financial interest, (ii) what can constitute a broad interest with an underlying financial imperative can be distinguished from what can otherwise be described as a “busy body” (a term and distinction also used in Randall), and (iii) the underlying implication in the case law is that, save for an executor, absent a financial interest (however remote) one is likely to fall into the category of being a “busy body” in the absence of other circumstances.
The commentary on the sufficiency of interest has dried up since the introduction of r. 57.7(1); the leading texts simply rehearse the above post-Randall position. The onc exception is the learned authors of Butterworths Wills Probate and Administration Service who suggest “Outside of personal representatives, ‘interest in the estate’ is to be given a broad meaning, and appears to be effectively synonymous with a financial interest in the outcome of a challenge to the validity of the will.”
It is clear that each case will turn on its own facts and there is no rigidity to the test. However, whilst flexible, there remains a test. It is my view the test is whether a probate claimant has a financial interest – be it direct, remote, future, or contingent – in the estate of the deceased and/or the outcome of the will challenge.
Notwithstanding his conclusion in Green, Master Bragge held the probate claim should proceed as “there is real interest, as far as administration of justice is concerned having regard to the two witness statements that have actually been provided, in having this matter adjudicated”.
That conclusion, with respect to the Master, is wrong:
1. Firstly, it is contrary to the plain meaning of r 57.7(1) and the long standing practice of the probate courts to disallow someone who does not have an interest in the estate to interfere.
2. Secondly, per Randall, the question of who is permitted to bring a probate claim is a matter of procedural law. The court should not entertain a claim brought by a person who cannot procedurally bring that claim.
3. Thirdly, the court would be placed in the position of determining where on a sliding scale a “busy body” without a financial interest can interfere. That runs directly contrary to the interest requirement and is wholly undesirable.
4. Fourthly, Master Bragge’s desire to enable a 1975 Act claimant to contest a will can be rationalised on the basis he was wrong to conclude they could not do so, but correct that justice should permit the will to be challenged.
5. Fifthly, although not clear, it appears in Green the probate claim by the 1975 Act claimant did not continue to trial but the counterclaim to propound against the will on formality grounds did.
6. Sixthly, it would run contrary to the policy of encouraging settlement if someone without a financial interest in the estate were permitted to be involved on nothing but their own notions of, for example, upholding the deceased’s wishes.
The courts should not tolerate interference from someone without a financial interest. We are all too aware of the number of “busy bodies” in probate claims, the proliferation of which has only increased in recent years with the rapid increase in estate claims and proliferation of AI. To allow those without a financial interest to challenge a will would open the flood gates to even more probate claims, stretching the ever-thinning resources of the courts even further and forcing personal representatives and beneficiaries into litigation against persons who have no skin in the game other than a costs risk.
Ultimately, in such circumstances the putative probate claimant does not have a cause of action. It cannot be and is not right that such a person can nevertheless bring a claim.
Derek Reginald Adams (“the Deceased”) died on 23 November 2020. He made a will dated 16 November 2020 (“the Will”) under which Richard Adams, the Deceased’s son, was one of three executors. In that capacity, Mr Adams brought a debt claim against Mr Farmer. Throughout those proceedings, Mr Farmer made overtures the Will was invalid and Mr Adams lacked standing to bring the claim. Eventually due to Mr Farmer’s continued assertions, after trial but before handing down judgment, HHJ Berkley directed Mr Farmer to bring a probate claim challenging the validity of the Will failing which he would proceed to hand down judgment.
After a messy start and his first probate claim being struck out due to a failure to serve in time, Mr Farmer brought his challenge to the validity of the Will. In his Particulars of Claim (drafted by chancery counsel), Mr Farmer stated his interest was as a legatee under a previous will. So far, so good. The twist: Mr Farmer only had the first page of that will. There was no evidence of execution. Mr Farmer therefore did not seek to propound the will. He conceded in his Particulars of Claim he could not do so. Rather, Mr Farmer invited the court to declare the Deceased died intestate. It will be seen Mr Farmer was attempting to invalidate the debt proceedings.
What, then, is the position?
Mr Farmer obviously does not fall into the usual cadre of probate claimants. There is superficial attraction in Mr Farmer relying upon his status as a beneficiary under an earlier will. That would, of course, be a sufficient interest if he sought to propound that will. That is not what Mr Farmer sought. Mr Farmer sought an intestacy despite not being an intestacy beneficiary. Accordingly, he had no financial interest in the estate in light of his concessions. In relation to the Deceased’s estate, whether the Will is valid or an intestacy declared, nothing changed for him.
I acted for Mr Adams in his application to strike out Mr Farmer’s claim, heard in the High Court in Bristol. Sadly, the judgment was unreported. However, in striking out the claim, the High Court accepted the analysis above that the test applicable under CPR 57.7(1) is whether a probate claimant has a financial interest – be it direct, remote, future, or contingent – in the estate of the deceased and outcome of the will challenge.
Ollie Murrell acted for Richard Adams, instructed by Caroline Cowley and Hannah McIntosh of Foot Anstey.
Call: 2022
Sign up
To be kept up-to-date with our latest news and future events, please complete the short form.
A member of the clerking team will help you resolve your request.
